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C.2d 
in a divorce 
it always 
terminated on death or ( Civ. § 139.) Thus, 
there was no necessity for the 1951 amendment unless it ap-
plied to support in integrated agreements. 
In my opinion, the obligation in the present case 
did not terminate on death or for the parties 
"otherwise they did not men-
tion death or or any other but by 
providing that the should continue until the "first 
day of July, 1956" that the payments were not to 
terminate for any reason before that date. By specifying that 
date, they necessarily precluded any other. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for a rehearing and 
application to augment the record were denied October 17, 
1957. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted.. 
[S. F. No. 19375. In Bank. Sept. 17, 1957.] 
FLORENCE E. CARNEY, as Administratrix, etc., Plain-
tiff and Appellant, v. ANNA SIMMONDS et al., De-
fendants and Appellants. 
[1] New Trial-Necessity for Issues of Fact: Grounds.-A new 
trial may be granted on the "issues" on the grounds, among 
others, of errors in law occurring at the trial, that the verdict 
or decision is against the law, and irregularity in the proceed-
ings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) 
[2] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 590 
(stating how issues of fact may be raised), 656 (defining new 
trial), must be read and construed in conjunction with the 
basic section on motions for new trial, namely, Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 657, which provides that "any" decision may be vacated or 
modified on motion for new trial, thereby indicating that the 
[2] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 9; Am.Jur., New Trial, § 20. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] New Trial, §§ 9, 19; [2, 4-7] New 
Trial, § 9; [8] Decedents' Estates, § 1078; [9] Decedents' Estates, 
§ 1077; [10] Judgments,§ 251(5); [11] Pleading,§ 58; [12] Plead-
ing, § 243; [13] Pleading, § 111. 
CARNEY v. SIMMONDS 
[ 49 C.2d 84; 315 P.2d 3051 
85 
decision need not be based on a question of fact, 
and which also the new trial may be on 
"all" or of the issues," further pointing to no distinction 
between and law (the issues). 
[3] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact: Grounds.-The grounds for 
a new trial motion may be either issues of fact, such as insuffi-
of the or issues of such as 
in proceedings of the court, 
conduct of the jury," that the is "against the law," 
"error in law occurring at the trial'' and others (Code Civ. 
§ 657); these grounds clearly indicate that issues of 
law may be reexamined on a motion for new trial. 
!d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-There may be a "trial" 
and hence a situation proper for a new trial motion where only 
issues of law are determined. 
[5] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-As a matter of orderly 
procedure, there is no less reason why the trial court should 
have a second chance to reexamine its judgment where issues 
of fact are involved than where issues of law or law and fact 
are decided. 
[6] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-A motion for new trial is 
proper procedure in any of the following classes of judgment: 
judgment of dismissal after demurrer sustained (disapproving 
Jones v. Chalfant, 128 Cal. 334 [60 P. 852]; Oonfar v. Whelan, 
8 Cal.App.2d 101 [46 P.2d 991]; Richardson v. United etc. of 
Carpenters &: Joiners, 129 Cal.App.2d 249 [276 P.2d 636]; 
Holmes v. Justice's Court, 19 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 [65 P.2d 
820]) ; judgment of dismissal generally (disapproving City of 
Pasadena v. Su,perior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P. 968)); 
judgment on the pleadings (disapproving Abbey Land etc. Go. 
v. County of San Mateo, 167 Cal. 434 [139 P. 1068]; Hotel 
Park Oentml, Inc. v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.2d 
293 [59 P.2d 606]; Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal.App.2d 517 
[252 P.2d 637]); and judgment on agreed statement of ulti-
mate facts (disapproving Gregory v. Gregory, 102 Cal. 50 [36 
P. 364] ; City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309, 314 
[298 P. 968]; Kaye v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 269 [164 
P. 912]; Quist v. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748 [99 P. 204]; Monte-
verde v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.App. 252 [212 P. 690); Pahlka 
v. McOormiclc, 123 Cal.App.2d 763 [267 P.2d 390]; Gillmore 
v. American Central Ins. Go., 65 Cal. 63 [2 P. 882]); but pos-
sibly not in the case of default judgments or judgments by 
agreement or confession where there may be the question of 
the right of the moving party to make any objection to the 
judgment. 
[7a, 7b] !d.-Necessity for Issues of Fact.-There is no difference 
between a judgment on the pleadings and one after the sus-
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taining of a demurrer; both are judgments on the 
pleadings and may be vacated or set aside on motion for new 
trial. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Equitable Relief From Decree-Pleading. 
-In an action by decedent's mother for equitable relief from 
a decree assigning the entire estate to the surviving widow, 
the complaint stated a cause of action where it alleged either 
directly or by inference that plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
application for setting aside the estate and was not given 
notice thereof although she knew the probate proceedings were 
pending, that the administratrix was fraudulent in represent-
ing to the court that she had given special notice and in her 
failure to give notice for the purpose of enhancing the amount 
that would be received from the estate by defendant widow, 
that to carry out that fraud she misrepresented the value of 
the estate to the court, that as a result plaintiff did not contest 
the proceedings and, since the estate exceeded $2,500, that the 
result would have been different but for the fraud. 
[9] !d.-Equitable Relief From Decree-Fraud.-Equity may af-
ford relief from orders and decrees in probate proceedings 
for extrinsic fraud. 
[10] Judgments-Equitable Relief-Fraud.-A judgment may be 
attacked in equity on the ground of extrinsic fraud where it 
appears that there was a willful failure to give the required 
notice or that willfully false affidavits of service were filed. 
[11] Pleading-Complaint-Effect of Prayer.-The prayer of a 
complaint does not destroy an otherwise sufficiently stated 
cause of action. 
[12] !d.-Motion for Judgment on Pleadings.-Where facts stated 
in the pleadings indicate that plaintiff may have a good cause 
of action but that it has been defectively or imperfectly 
pleaded, but defendants do not call attention to such defects 
either by demurrer or by duly noticed motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, although they have long known the condition 
of the pleadings preceding trial, the court should not grant 
their surprise motion for judgment on the pleadings, which 
attacked the pleadings for the first time at the time of trial, 
without first giving plaintiff an opportunity to elect whether 
she would stand on the pleadings or amend them; and de-
fendants' failure to give plaintiff notice of intention to attack 
the pleadings prior to trial excuses plaintiff's failure to go to 
trial armed with formal amendments to offer. 
[13] Id.-Amendment.-Plaintiff was justified in assuming that 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 861; Am. 
Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 490. 
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a formal motion to amend her complaint would have been 
futile where the trial court adopted defendants' view that the 
pleadings could not be amended to state a cause of action. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County and from an order granting a new trial and 
vacating the judgment. Leonard R. Avilla, Judge. Appeal 
from judgment dismissed; order affirmed. 
Action for equitable relief from judgment assigning entire 
estate to surviving widow. Appeal from judgment on plead-
ings against plaintiff dismissed; order granting plaintiff's mo-
tion for new trial, affirmed. 
Eugene S. Clifford and Heller, Ehrman, White & Mc-
Auliffe for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Jacobsen & Tobin and Harold W. Tobin for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
CARTER, J.-In this case plaintiff commenced an action 
which she entitled one for the partition of real property 
against defendants. Defendants' demurrer was overruled 
and plaintiff filed an amended complaint. No demurrer was 
filed to the amended complaint; it was answered, defendants 
claiming among other things that it did not state a cause 
of action. When it came on for trial defendants moved for 
a "judgment on the pleadings" on the ground that the 
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action in that it 
purported to attack a decree assigning the entire estate to 
a widow on the ground of extrinsic fraud but failed to allege 
such fraud or show that a different result would have been 
reached but for the fraud. It was argued and then the court 
stated that if plaintiff was able to prove what she alleged, she 
had a cause of action but "this" is not it; the defendants' 
motion for "judgment on the pleadings is granted." Then 
followed a discussion about amending the amended complaint 
and the court said it granted the motion without leave to 
amend. The court made and filed an order for ''judgment on 
the pleadings" without leave to amend and for defendants. 
It also entered a judgment on that order. Plaintiff gave 
notice of motion ''for a new trial and for order vacating 
and setting aside judgment" on the pleadings and for an 
order allowing her to file a proposed amended complaint. The 
88 0.2d 
court made its motion 
for a new trial, vacated the and gave plaintiff 
leave to amend. Defendants appeal from the order granting 
a new trial and vacating the judgment; plaintiff cross-appeal£ 
from the judgment. Treating the motion and order as one for 
new trial, it must be considered as a proper procedure for 
the reasons hereinafter stated. 
The statutes on new trial that: 'A new trial is a 
re-examination of an issue of fact in the same court after a 
trial and decision by a jury, court or referee." (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 656.) ''An issue of law arises upon a demurrer to 
the complaint or answer, or to some part thereof." (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 589.) "An issue of fact arises--
'' 1. Upon a material allegation in the complaint con-
troverted by the answer ; and, 
"2. Upon new matters in the answer, except an issue of 
law is joined thereon." (Code Civ. Proc., § 590.) [1] A new 
trial may be granted on the ''issues'' on the grounds, among 
others, errors in law occurring at the trial, that the verdict 
or decision is against the law and irregularity in the proceed-
ings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657.) 
It has been held, in a first group of cases, that pursuant 
to sections 590 and 656, as to various classes of judgments, 
a motion for a new trial was not the proper procedure; that 
the trial court should not grant a motion for a new 
trial: (1) Judgment of dismissal after demurrer sustained: 
Jones v. Chalfant, 128 Cal. 334 [60 P. 852] ; Confar v. 
Whelan, 8 Cal.App.2d 101 [46 P.2d 991]; Richardson v. 
United etc. of Carpenters & Joiners, 129 Cal.App.2d 249 [276 
P.2d 636] ; Holmes v. Justice's Court, 19 Cal.App.2d 362, 
366 [65 P.2d 820]. (2) Judgment of dismissal generally: 
City of Pasadena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P. 
968]. (3) Judgment on the pleadings: Abbey Land etc. Co. 
v. County of San Mateo, 167 Cal. 434 [139 P. 1068, Ann.Cas. 
1915C 804, 52 L.R.A.N.S. 408], Hotel Park Central, Inc. v. 
Security-First Nat. Bank, 15 Cal.App.2d 293 [59 P.2d 
606]; Budrow v. Wheatcraft, 115 Cal.App.2d 517 [252 P.2d 
637]. (4) Judgment on agreed statement of ultimate facts: 
Gregory v. Gregory, 102 Cal. 50 [36 P. 364] ; City of Pasa-
dena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309, 314 [298 P. 968] ; Kaye 
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App. 269 [164 P. 912] ; Quist v. 
Sandman, 154 Cal. 748 [99 P. 204]; Monteverde v. Superior 
Court, 60 Cal.App. 252 [212 P. 690] ; Pahlka v. McCormick, 
123 Cal.App.2d 763 [267 P.2d 390] ; Gillmore v. American 
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Central Ins. P. Default judg-
ments: McRae v. 8 241 [96 P. 505] ; 
nvtc'IJP.S. 34 Ca1.2d 355 [209 P.2d 937]; Crackel v. 
600 P. ; Rehfuss v. Rehfuss, 
; Waldecker v. Waldecker, 178 Cal. 
120 Cal. 33 P. 65 
66 Cal. 
P. 549] ; Estate 
149 Cal. 487 [ 87 P. ; Connell v. McGahie, 37 Cal. 
P. ; Hall v. 42 Cal.2d 435, 439 
P.2d 249]. It has been said generally that a motion for 
a new trial is not proper where no issue of fact is tried. 
(Holmes v. Justice's Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 
P.2d 820] ; Jones v. Chalfant, supra, 128 Cal. 334; Reeves 
v. Reeves, supra, 34 Cal.2d 355; Rinaldo v. Superior Court, 
15 Cal.App.2d 585 [59 P.2d 868]; Foley v. Foley, supra, 120 
Cal. 33; Hotel Park Central, Inc. v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 
supra, 15 Cal.App.2d 293; Pahlka v. McCormick, supra, 123 
Cal.App.2d 763; Clark v. Torchiana, 19 Cal.App. 786, 790 
[127 P. 831]; Hall v. Hall, supra, 42 Ca1.2d 435; Stockton 
Iron Works v. Walters, 18 Cal.App. 373 [123 P. 240]; Estate 
Richards, 139 Cal. 72 [72 P. 633].) 
On the contrary, in a second group of cases, it has been 
held that a motion for a new trial is proper in the following 
situations: ,Judgment on the pleadings (class 3 of group 1 
above) (see Allen v. California Mut. B. & L. Assn., 40 Cal. 
App.2d 374 [104 P.2d 851]; Moore v. Bates, 46 Cal. 29) or in 
effect the same kind of judgment, the sustaining of an objec-
tion to the introduction of any evidence for one reason or 
another including the failure of the complaint to state a cause 
of action followed by judgment for defendant. (Moore v. 
Bates, supra, 46 Cal. 29; Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379 
[80 P. 234]; Stow v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. 140 [172 P. 
598] ; Allen v. California Mt~t. B. & L. Assn., supra, 40 Cal. 
App.2d 374; Bice v. Stevens, 129 Cal.App.2d 342 [277 P.2d 
106] .) Judgment of nonsuit either on plaintiff's opening 
statement or after his evidence is presented (Carton Corpora-
tion v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 434, 436 [244 P. 932]; 
Castillo v. Warren, 44 Cal.App.2d 903 [113 P.2d 232]; Con-
verse v. Scott, 137 Cal. 239 [70 P. 13] ; Toulouse v. Pare, 103 
Cal. 251 r37 P. 146]; Bmley v. Empire Water Co., 130 Cal. 
App. 532 [20 P.2d 75] ). Judgment on a directed verdict 
v. Werner, 28 Cal.App.2d 554 [83 P.2d 56]). And 
a motion for a new trial has been indicated as proper al-
90 CARN'EY v. SIMMONDS [49 C.2d 
though the issue tried was not one of fact. (See Horstman 
v. Krumgold, 55 Cal.App.2d 296 [130 P.2d 721] ; City of Pasa-
dena v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. 309 [298 P. 968] ; Bice v. 
Stevens, supra, 129 Cal.App.2d 342.) 
To clarify the law we deem it necessary to re-examine the 
law on this subject. The basic reason underlying the decisions 
in the five classes of judgments in the first group above men-
tioned holding a new trial not proper appears to be that a 
motion for a new trial should not be entertained where the 
only issue tried is one of law as distinguished from one of 
fact or one of law and fact. [2] This reason might seem 
justified on the basis of sections 656 and 590 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, quoted supra, but those sections must be 
read and construed in conjunction with the basic section on 
motions for a new trial, section 657 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. It provides that "any" decision may be vacated or 
modified on motion for a new trial, indicating that the decision 
need not necessarily be based on a question of fact. The new 
trial may be on ''all'' or ''part of the issues'' further point-
ing to no distinction between fact and law (the issues). 
[3] The grounds for the new trial motion may be either 
issues of fact such as insufficiency of the evidence or issues 
of law such as "irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party," "misconduct of the jury," that the 
decision is "against the law," "error in law occurring at the 
trial,'' and others. These grounds clearly indicate that issues 
of law may be reexamined on a motion for a new trial. 
[4] Moreover it should be observed that there may be a 
"trial" and hence a situation proper for a new trial motion 
where only issues of law are determined. (See Berri v. 
Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 856 [279 P.2d 8] .) [5] As a 
matter of orderly procedure there is no less reason why the 
trial court should have a second chance to reexamine its 
judgment where issues of fact are involved than where issues 
of law or law and fact are decided. [6] We conclude there-
fore that a motion for a new trial is proper procedure in any 
of the classes of judgments mentioned in the first group of 
cases above cited whether the judgment is based on law or 
fact or both, except possibly in the case of default judgments 
or judgments by agreement or confession where there may 
be the question of the right of the moving party to make any 
objection to the judgment. The cases cited in support of the 
judgments in classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the first group of cases 
are disapproved as well as the statements in those cases 
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which limit a new trial to a case where there has been an 
issue of fact tried ; the results reached in the second group of 
cases are approved. There are suggestions in some of the cases 
that where judgment is entered after a demurrer is sustained 
a new trial should not be proper, but there appears to be no 
difference between that situation and the others in the first 
four classes of judgment in the first group of cases above cited. 
The issue determined in all is one of law. [7a] For illus-
tration, there is no difference between a judgment on the 
pleadings and one after the sustaining of a demurrer; they 
are both judgments on the pleadings. (Dragna v. White, 45 
Cal.2d 469 [289 P.2d 428] ; Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining 
Co., 43 Cal.2d 769 [278 P.2d 694].) We hold, therefore, that 
a motion for a new trial was proper in the case at bar. It 
must be determined therefore whether the new trial was 
properly granted under the circumstances here presented. 
Plaintiff1 alleges in her amended complaint that she is the 
mother of Thomas Simmonds, deceased, who died intestate, and 
owner as tenant in common of a half interest in described real 
property; that defendants are McMinn, the administrator of 
Thomas' estate, and his widow, and they claim an interest in 
the property; that the property was the separate property of 
Thomas and there being no issue of his marriage, plaintiff and 
his widow each inherited a half interest under section 223 
of the Probate Code; that on October 2, 1951, plaintiff served 
a request for special notice of estate proceedings on the attor-
neys for McMinn ;2 that "Plaintiff is informed and believes 
and therefore alleges that said ... McMinn on or about the 
15th day of October, 1951, fraudulently procured a decree pur-
portedly assigning the whole estate of Thomas ... deceased, to 
the surviving widow, 3 the defendant4 ••• ; that in order to 
obtain said decree said defendant ... McMinn fraudulently 
and with intent to deceive said Court and to obtain a greater 
interest in the real property . . . represented to the Court 
1Her administrator was substituted in her place since she died. "'f an heir requests special notice of estate proceedings, notice shall 
be given to him by mail or personally served. (Prob. Code, §§ 1202, 
1200.) 
'If decedent leaves a surviving spouse and the net value of the estate 
over any homestead interest does not exceed $2,500, it may be set aside 
to the surviving spouse. (Prob. Code, §§ 640-646.) 
'In her proposed second amended complaint on motion for a new trial 
the :filing of which the court authorized in its order granting the motion 
the matters are directcy alleged. 
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that notice had been in 
Section 1200 of the Probate Code 
defendant well knew that notice had not been 
tiff to her as hereinabove 
defendant further and with intent to deceive 
the said Court that the value of said estate did 
not exceed at the time of decedent's death; that defend-
ant . . . the widow of said did not possess other 
estate in excess of in ; and that the entire estate, 
including the real ... consisted of community prop-
erty; that at the time of said fraudulent representa-
tions, defendant well knew that said real property was not 
community property but the separate property of the dece-
dent, and defendant .Anna Simmonds possessed property hav-
ing a value in excess of $7,500." That: ".As a result of the 
facts, fraud and fraudulent concealments hereinabove alleged, 
plaintiff was not made aware of the pendency of the hearing 
of the said decree assigning the estate to defendant .Anna 
Simmonds, and therefore did not appear in said Court so as 
to present the true facts in this matter." That plaintiff "did 
not know or discover" or "suspect" such a proceeding until 
July 7, 1952. Plaintiff prays that the "decree of distribu-
tion'' be set aside, for partition of the property and other 
relief. Plainly the main purpose of the action was to obtain 
equitable relief from the probate decree assigning all of 
Thomas' estate to defendant, his widow. 
Defendants assert that the complaint is insufficient because 
plaintiff's attack is collateral and extrinsic fraud must be 
pleaded ;5 that plaintiff's allegations that no notice was given 
were on information and belief when they should have been 
direct; that it does not appear that the request for notice was 
filed prior to the application to set the estate aside to defendant 
widow; that there is no allegation that special notice under 
sections 1200 and 1202 of the Probate Code was not given or 
that the court in the proceeding failed to make a finding as to 
the giving of special notice; that there is no allegation that 
the appraisal of the estate was incorrect; that no showing of a 
different result would have followed (refusal to set aside the 
estate except for the fraud) ; that plaintiff was guilty of 
"''In the absence of fraud in the procurement an order of the superior 
court assigning an estate pursuant to the provisions of the preceding 
section, when it becomes final, is a conclusive determination of the 
jurisdiction of the court (except when based on the erroneous assumption 
of death), and cannot be collaterally attacked." (Prob. Code, 9 645.1.) 
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to 1952, before 
knew of the probate 
the not entirely clear, we 
U<O'"WCHM defendants' claims as 
and construed 
v. Hibernia Bank, 
it states a cause of action. 
from the complaint and facts 
it is either or by inference that plain-
tiff had no knowledge of the application for setting aside the 
estate and was not given notice thereof although she knew 
the probate proceedings were pending; that her request for 
special notice was given before the hearing on the application 
to set aside the estate to defendant widow; that McMinn was 
fraudulent in representing to the court he had given special 
notice and in his failure to give notice for the purpose of en-
hancing the amount that would be received from the estate by 
defendant widow and to carry out that fraud misrepresented 
the value of the estate to the court; that as a result plaintiff did 
not contest the proceedings and, as the estate exceeded $2,500, 
the result would have been different, that is, it would not have 
been set aside. While the paragraph from the amended com-
plaint heretofore quoted commences with an allegation based 
on information and belief it does not necessarily follow that 
the whole paragraph is so based; it may be reasonably inter-
preted to apply only to the first clause, leaving the balance as 
direct allegations on knowledge. It appears therefore that a 
reasonable construction would point to a fraudulent exclusion 
of plaintiff from the hearing on the application to set aside 
the estate. In Purinton v. Dyson, 8 Cal.2d 322 [65 P.2d 777, 
113 A.L.R. 1230), the court was considering a case where for 
fraudulent reasons no notice was given in a probate pro-
ceeding to a granddaughter of decedent who was not men-
tioned in the will. The court held there was extrinsic fraud, 
stating (p. 324): "Respondent's case rests upon extrinsic 
fraud alleged to have been committed by Schaffer in conduct-
ing the probate proceedings in the estate of Adeline Potter 
without disclosing her relationship to the deceased and notify-
ing the respondent of the proceedings. The complaint alleged 
that at the time Schaffer filed his petition for probate of 
the Potter will, he knew that respondent was the grand-
daughter of :Mrs. Potter; that she was residing in Los Angeles, 
94 CARNEY v. SIMMONDS [49 C.2d 
California; and that his failure to disclose her existence was 
for the purpose of defrauding respondent out of her share of 
the estate .... 
" ... The case, therefore, presents a situation where ac-
cording to the findings of the trial court an executor, who 
was practically the sole beneficiary of the estate, kept an 
heir in ignorance of the death of her ancestor 'with fraudu-
lent design and intent to gain for himself a share of said 
estate which rightfully and lawfully belonged to' such heir .... 
[9] "It is well settled that equity may afford relief from 
orders and decrees in probate proceedings for extrinsic fraud. 
(Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 475 [23 P.2d 758, 88 A.L.R. 
1194].) But appellant insists that any fraud practiced by 
Schaffer was intrinsic. The theory of this contention is, prin-
cipally, that fraud to be extrinsic must be practiced directly 
upon the plaintiff in such an action .... 
[10] "In the early case of Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 326 
[67 P. 282, 87 Am.St.Rep. 98], extrinsic fraud was said to 
consist 'in the failure to give legal notice to the adversary, 
the prevention of him or his witnesses from attending the 
trial, and the like.' In Caldwell v. Taylor, supra, where the 
entire subject was exhaustively considered, the court said: 
'The main requirement to establish extrinsic fraud is that the 
unsuccessful party was prevented by his adversary from pre-
senting all of his case to the court. One of the examples 
given is that of a party who is prevented from appearing in 
court.' ... 
"However, it is difficult to see how fraud could be prac-
ticed more directly upon one entitled to present his rights 
to a court than by keeping him in ignorance of the proceed-
ings. It is true that in most cases of extrinsic fraud the 
defendant has said something directly to the person whose 
rights were involved amounting to representations that it was 
not necessary for such person to take any part in the pro-
ceedings. In other cases, acts have been held to amount to 
such representations. But the rule allowing the maintenance 
of an action in equity for extrinsic fraud should not be limited 
so strictly as to require as a basis evidence of representations 
made directly to the one defrauded. 
"In this case notice of the hearing of Schaffer's petitions 
was required to be served upon the heirs of the testator either 
personally or by mail. ... Schaffer as the proponent of the will 
in the first instance and as the duly qualified and appointed 
executor thereof after it was admitted to probate, was charged 
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with the utmost good faith to the heirs of the deceased and 
to the court. It was his duty to see that notice of the proceed-
ings was given to those whom he knew to be heirs of Mrs. 
Potter. The same situation was considered in the case of 
Zaremba v. Woods, 17 Cal.App.2d 309 [61 P.2d 976]. There 
the executor of a will also presented a petition stating that 
the deceased left no heirs. It was claimed, as it is here, that his 
representation amounted to intrinsic but not extrinsic fraud. 
But the court held that the allegation constituted extrinsic 
fraud, saying: 'There is a clear line of demarcation, however, 
between a statement made in the petition for the probate of 
the will which would limit the giving of notices to heirs, and 
testimony in court to the effect that there were no such 
heirs, after the heirs had been notified of the proceeding for 
the probate of the will, as provided by the different sections 
of the Probate Code.' 
"Whatever may have been the motive of Schaffer, whether 
it was induced by the agreement which the court found he 
made with Mrs. Potter's son, or by some other reason, his acts 
in suppressing all information concerning respondent and 
representing Thomas Purinton to be the only son of the de-
ceased, amounts to fraud practiced directly against the re-
spondent. They furnish abundant foundation for a judgment 
holding him to have been a trustee for the property which 
should have been distributed to the respondent but which he 
wrongfully received." (See Estate of Charters, 46 Cal.2d 
227 [293 P.2d 778]; Craney v. Low, 46 Cal.2d 757 [298 P.2d 
860]; Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 47 Cal.2d 540; Van 
Strien v. Jones, 46 Cal.2d 705, 706 [229 P.2d 1].) It should 
be observed that plaintiff's equitable attack on the order set-
ting aside the estate is a direct rather than a collateral one. 
(Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 47 Cal.2d 540, 558.) 
And, "Such an attack may be made upon the ground of 
extrinsic fraud where it appears that there was a willful 
fm7ure to give the required service or that willfully false affi-
davits of service were filed .... A direct attack has also been 
allowed in an independent action in equity where there has 
been a failure to exercise the degree of diligence required 
by law in connection with personal service [citations], where 
false recitals of service were the result of fraud, negligence, 
or mistake [citation], and where failure to name a person 
as a party was the result of mistake [citation]. These cases 
are in accord with the general principles followed in recent 




of his death 
Also, as we have 
Hibernia either or, in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, could have discovered that was Curtin's succes-
sor." (Emphasis added Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, supra, 
47 Cal.2d 540.) 
[7b] 'fhe other matters urged by defendants involve prob-
lems of clarification of the amended complaint and might have 
been raised on special demurrer but here we have a judgment 
on the pleadings which is the same as a judgment after sus-
taining a general demurrer. (Beverage v. Canton Placer 
Mining Co., sttpra, 43 Cal.2d 769; Dragna v. White, supra, 
45 Cal.2d 469.) 
[11] There is some question as to the prayer of the com-
plaint and its title which indicate a partition proceeding 
but the prayer does not destroy an otherwise sufficiently stated 
cause of action. (See Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489 [289 
P.2d 794]; Babbitt v. Babbitt, 44 Cal.2d 289 [282 P.2d 1].) 
Moreover, it would appear plaintiff should have been per-
mitted to amend her complaint. After argument on defend-
ants' motion for judgment on the pleadings the following 
transpired : 
''THE CouRT: Well, Counsel, I think if you are able to prove 
the allegations alleged in the Complaint, you have a cause of 
action, but I don't think this is it. 
"The motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. 
"MR. TOBIN [defendants' counsel]: Thank you, Your 
Honor. 
"MR. CLIFFORD [plaintiff's counsel] : Is that with leave 
to amend, Your Honor Y 
''THE CouRT : I don't see how you can amend. 
"MR. CLIFFORD: I think we can, Your Honor. 
''THE CouRT : How do you propose to amend 1 
"MR. CLIFFORD: I propose to amend, Your Honor, by show-
ing that if Your Honor was apparently impressed by the 
other case, that another result would be achieved had the 
decree not been made in San Francisco, and I can show, Your 
Honor, that-as a matter of fact, the other case was com-
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demonstrative of the that we have in this case 
that a cause of action has been stated; that this was extrinsic 
fraud. 
"THE CouRT: I think you may have another cause of action 
"MR. ToBIN: I'd like to say, Your Honor, in that connec-
tion-
' 'MR. CLIFFORD: The motion is without leave 
amendf 
"THE CouRT : Right. 
''MR. ToBIN : Thank you." 
[12] While a more clearcut request for amendment could 
have been made, assuming one was necessary, we think it was 
sufficient and clearly there is a reasonable possibility (Lemoge 
Electric v. County of San Mateo, 46 Cal.2d 659 [297 P.2d 
638]) that matters going to the claimed failure to state a 
cause of action could have been cured by amendment. The 
statement in Beverage v. Canton Placer Mining Co., 43 Cal.2d 
769,778 [278 P.2d 694], is pertinent: "The facts stated in the 
pleadings indicate that plaintiffs may have a good cause of 
action but that it has been defectively or imperfectly pleaded. 
Defendants did not call attention to these claimed defects 
either by demurrer or by duly noticed motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, although they had long known the condition 
of the pleadings preceding the trial. Under such conditions 
the trial court should not have granted the surprise motion, 
which attacked the pleadings for the first time at the time of 
trial, without first giving plaintiffs an opportunity to elect 
whether they would stand on their pleadings or amend them. 
[Citation.] Defendants' failure to give plaintiffs notice of 
their intention to attack the pleadings prior to the trial also 
excuses the failure of plaintiffs to go to the trial armed with 
formal amendments to offer to the court in the event that the 
pleadings are unexpectedly attacked. (Macisaac v. Pozzo, 
supra [26 Cal.2d 809 (161 P.2d 449)].) ... [13] In addi-
tion there is some justification for the failure of plaintiffs to 
formally move to amend. D~fendants constantly took the 
position that the pleadings could not be amended to state a 
cause of action. The trial court adopted defendants' view and 
repeatedly stated that the complaint could not be so amended. 
Faced with this attitude plaintiffs apparently were convinced, 
and were justified in assuming, that a formal offer to amend 
would have been futile." Furthermore, the policy of section 
oW C.Jd.-4 
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472c of the Code of Civil Procedure6 should, by analogy, be 
applied. 
The order vacating the judgment and granting a new trial 
is affirmed. Since this leaves no judgment standing in the 
case, the appeal therefrom is dismissed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, 
Comb, J ., concurred. 
Traynor, J., Spence, J., and Me-
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment, and am in general accord with the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Carter except insofar as it holds that plaintiff's first 
amended complaint in its present form states a cause of action 
for extrinsic fraud. In my view, even the most liberal con-
struction of the allegations relating to fraud which appear in 
plaintiff's first amended complaint does not render those alle-
gations sufficient to state a cause of action based on extrinsic 
fraud. 
The first amended complaint alleges, in material part, as 
follows: ''Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore 
alleges that said Berdella Marie McMinn on or about the 15th 
day of October, 1951, fraudulently procured a decree pur-
portedly assigning the whole estate of Thomas J. Simmonds 
deceased, to the surviving widow, the defendant Anna Sim-
monds; that in order to obtain said decree said defendant 
Berdella Marie McMinn fraudulently and with intent to 
deceive said Court and to obtain a greater interest in the 
real property hereinabove described, represented to the Court 
that notice had been given in all respects as required by Sec-
tion 1200 of the Probate Code during which time said defend-
ant well knew that notice had not been given to plaintiff 
pursuant to her request as hereinabove alleged. Said defend-
ant further fraudulently and with intent to deceive the said 
Court represented that the value of said estate did not exceed 
$2,500 at the time of decedent's death; that defendant Anna 
Simmonds, the widow of said decedent, did not possess other 
estate in excess of $5,000 in value; and that the entire estate, 
including the real property hereinabove described, consisted of 
community property; that at the time of making said fraudu-
•"When any court makes an order sustaining a demurrer without 
leave to amend the question as to whether or not such court abused its 
discretion in making such an order is open on appeal even though no 
request to amend such pleading was made; provided, however, that this 
section shall not apply to any pending action or proceeding." (Code 
Civ. Proc., t 472e.) 
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lent representations, defendant well knew that said real prop-
erty was not community property but the separate property 
of the decedent, and defendant Anna Simmonds possessed 
property having a value in excess of $7,500." 
The extrinsic fraud complained of is the alleged failure 
of the administratrix McMinn to notify plaintiff of the pend-
ing proceeding to set aside the entire estate of the deceden1 
to his surviving widow. Any fraud in the representations of 
the administratrix as to the value and character of the prop-
erty involved is intrinsic, and does not affect the alleged denial 
to plaintiff of her day in court. (See Stiebel v. Roberts 
(1941), 42 Cal.App.2d 434,438-439 [3] [109 P.2d 22].) Thus 
only the first sentence of the above quoted allegation is 
pertinent to the inquiry of whether the complaint states a 
cause of action grounded on extrinsic fraud. 
The first segment of the allegation under consideration 
states on information and belief the general proposition that 
the decree assigning the entire estate to the surviving widow 
was fraudulently procured. The remaining clauses of that 
sentence purport to state the manner in which such fraud was 
practiced, viz., by a representation by defendant McMinn to 
the court that the required statutory notice had been given, 
at a time when McMinn knew that such notice had in fact 
not been given. If plaintiff knew positively the facts which 
constituted the alleged fraud, then there would be no need 
to allege on information and belief that such fraud had been 
committed; conversely, if plaintiff alleges on information and 
belief that fraud has been perpetrated, then it must follow 
that succeeding allegations as to the basis of the fraud are 
also made on information and belief. While it is true that the 
mere fact that a paragraph of a complaint commences with 
an allegation on information and belief does not necessarily 
require the conclusion that the entire paragraph is so based, in 
the sentence here under consideration an interpretation that 
the information and belief basis applies only to the first clause 
of the sentence and not to the succeeding amplifying clauses 
is neither reasonable nor proper. Certainly if the pleader were 
on trial for perjury in her averments-and the manifest objec-
tive of requiring verified pleadings is the truthful definition 
of the real issues of fact on pain of perjury-all of the quoted 
allegations would be construed to be only on information and 
belief. 
It is not questioned that the acts attributed to the adminis-
tratrix on the information and belief basis, if proven, would 
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constitute extrinsic fraud which could properly form the 
basis for granting relief to But the complaint in its 
present form fails to the issue of extrinsic fraud to the 
trier of fact. " [I] t not sufficient to allege fraud or its 
elements upon information and belief, unless the facts upon 
which the belief is founded are stated in the pleading.'' 
(Dowling v. Water Oo. ), 174 CaL 218, 
221 [162 P. 894]; Findley v. Garrett (1952), 109 Cal.App. 
2d 166, 176-177 [3] [240 P.2d 421].) No facts are stated 
in the present complaint on which a belief might properly be 
based that the administratrix knew that the required notice 
had not been given at the time when she represented that it 
had been given. \Vhile it is true that ''there must be cases 
in which the knowledge of the fraud by its perpetrator must 
be charged on information and belief, ... [still] in such cases 
there mttst be allegations of facts which show positively or by 
reasonable inference that such knowledge must have been 
possessed by the person accused of the fraud." (Dowling v. 
Spring Valley Water Oo. (1917), supra, 174 Cal. 218, 221; 
italics added.) The allegations relative to extrinsic fraud in 
their present form without more cannot be considered suffi-
cient allegations of the charges made. (Mason v. San-ll al 
Oil & Water Oo., Ltd. (1934), 1 Cal.2d 670, 672 [2] [36 P.2d 
616].) 
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that the trial 
court was justified in holding that the complaint here did not 
state a cause of action. However, since, conceivably, plaintiff 
could have alleged facts constituting a basis of information 
and belief on which the conclusional fact of fraud could rest, 
or could have stated the allegations of fraud in positive terms, 1 
leave to amend the complaint should have been granted. 
The petition of defendants and appellants for a rehearing 
was denied October 17, 1957. 
'In the order of the trial court granting the motion for new trial, 
plaintiff was also granted permission to file an amended complaint. In 
this amended complaint the allegations as to fraud are st~ted positively. 
